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Abstract. We consider two ways to understand “reasoning as computa-
tion”, one which focuses on the computation of concept symbols and the
other on the computation of number symbols. We illustrate these two
ways with Llull’s Ars Combinatoria and Leibniz’s attempts to arithme-
tize language, respectively. We then argue that Boole’s development of
an algebra of reasoning was in a large part successful due to its ability to
marry the two types of computation that are exemplified in Llull’s and
Leibniz’s works.
1 Introduction
The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘computation’ as
1. a. The action or process of computing, reckoning, or counting; arith-
metical or mathematical calculation; an instance of this [1].
As with many dictionary definitions, this gloss is rather vague. There are (at
least) two interesting ways in which it may made precise: one focusing on the
words ‘action, process’ and the other on the words ‘calculation, reckoning, count-
ing, arithmetical, mathematical’. The first group of words suggests a mechanistic
view of computation, whereby computation is the result of a machine running
some algorithm or set of instructions. The second group of words, in that they
all refer more or less directly to numbers, can be seen as a specification of the
first group, by specifying that the actions or processes (mechanisms) involved
are numeric or arithmetic. It should be clear that numeric processes and actions
are not the only way to do computation; one non-numeric computational process
or mechanism involves computation with concepts directly, and not via numeri-
cal representation. Thus, the two views of computation that will be considered
in this paper are those indicated in the title: computation with concepts and
computation with numbers.1 These two branches or strands of computation are
 The author was funded by the project “Dialogical Foundations of Semantics” (DiFoS)
in the ESF EuroCoRes programme LogICCC (LogICCC-FP004; DN 231-80-002; CN
2008/08314/GW).
1 Strictly speaking, we should speak of “computation with concept-symbols” and “com-
putation with number-symbols (or numerals)”, since we are not directly operating
on the concepts and numbers themselves. However, we will use the less precise for-
mulation throughout the rest of the paper and trust the reader not to misunderstand
our intent.
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not intended to be exclusive, but rather, as we will see when we look at Boole,
as complimentary.
In ordinary use, “computation” has some connotation of mindlessness. Many
ordinary users of modern computers would subscribe to this view: computers
are something of a black box where the user provides input and receives an
output through a computational process which is often invisible, and even when
visible, can often be wholly impenetrable (for example, watching LATEX code
compile). As we’ll see, both Llull’s Ars Combinatoria and Leibniz’s attempts
to arithmetize language have this mindlessness component: In so far as these
systems are algorithmic, they move the burden of the actual reasoning from the
user to the system. This property is illustrated in Boole’s algebras by their level
of abstraction.
In this paper we survey two different but connected ways that we can un-
derstand “reasoning as computation”, and illustrate these ways by looking at
the works of three figures in the history of logic, Ramon Llull, Gottfried Wil-
helm Leibniz, and George Boole. Despite the well-documented inspiration that
Leibniz found in Llull’s works, Llull’s views of the computational side of reason-
ing contrast with Leibniz’s and Boole’s development of an algebra of reasoning
can be seen as a conceptual synthesis of the two. I argue that the success of
Boole’s innovation was due in large part to its ability to marry the two types of
computation that are exemplified in Llull’s and Leibniz’s works: computation as
rule-based manipulation of concepts and computation as arithmetic calculation.
The plan of the paper is as follows: To illustrate the conceptual view of com-
putation, in the next section we look at a particular aspect of Ramon Llull’s
system of reasoning developed in the 13th century. Llull, who can rightfully be
called a visionary for his ideas concerning the computational side of reasoning,
inspired Leibniz in his development of a calculus universalis in the 17th century.
One of Leibniz’s goals along the way to the calculus universalis was the arith-
metization of language, which serves as our example in Sec. 3 of the numeric or
arithmetic view of computation. We then argue in Sec. 4 that these two strands
are exemplified together in Boole’s development of the algebra of reason, and it
is their complementarity that was at least a partial cause of its success.
2 Llull and the Computation of Concepts
Ramon Llull (Catalan; Raymundus Lullus or Lullius, Latin; Rámon Lull, Span-
ish; Raymond Lull or Lully, English) was born in 1232 or early 1233 in Palma,
the capital of Majorca, to a family that was probably of noble status. In his
early years, he served as a courtier in the court of James I and James II of Ma-
jorca, which involved extensive travel through Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia.
In 1263 he experienced a religious conversion, and thereafter turned his atten-
tions from secular pursuits such as troubadour poetry lyrics, to theological and
philosophical topics. In the 1280s he conceived of a goal of developing a system
of argumentation or demonstration which could be used to show the Jew and
the Muslim the error of their ways, and the correctness of Christian theology.
In addition to knowing Catalan, his native language, he was also conversant in
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Fig. A Fig. T Questions & Rules Subjects Virtues Vices
B goodness difference whether? God justice avarice
C greatness concordance what? angel prudence gluttony
D eternity contrariety of what? heaven fortitude pride
E power beginning why? man temperance pride
F wisdom middle how much? imaginative faith accidie
G will end of what kind? sensitive hope envy
H virtue majority when? vegetative charity ire
I truth equality where? elementative patience lying
K glory minority how? and with what? instrumentative pity inconstancy
Fig. 1. The Alphabet of the Ars brevis [2, p. 581]
Latin and Arabic, the academic languages of his time. Part of implementing this
goal involved missionary travel throughout the Mediterranean. He died during
one of these journeys, either in Tunis or on a ship sailing from Tunis back home,
sometime between December 1315 and March 1316.2
Llull, with his adventurous life, mysticism, and connections in high places,
is an exciting figure for computer scientists to read and hear about. Given his
adventures (cf. the citations in fn. 2), it’s no wonder that computer scientists
would want to claim such a celebrity as one of their own. Why they should
do so is nicely argued by Sales in [4], who points out that in Llull’s work can
be found inklings of and first steps towards a number of concepts fundamental
in computer science, such as the ideas of a calculus, an ‘alphabet of thought’, a
method, a graph, of logical analysis, heuristics and deduction, generative systems,
tableaux, conceptual nets, and diagrams to represent concepts and relations
between concepts.3
Our interest here, in the context of “reasoning as computation”, are just two
out of Llull’s numerous (263 according to [2, p. 53]) works, the Ars demonstrativa
(Demonstrative Art, c. 1283–89, hereafter referred to as AD) and the Ars brevis
(Short Art, 1308, hereafter referred to as AB), the “single most influential work”,
which builds on and simplifies AD. These works together constitute the ‘Art’.
In the Art, Llull presents to the reader a mechanism for abstract reasoning
with a restricted range of application. The foundation of this mechanism is an
alphabet, a system of constants, representing different concepts. The alphabet of
AD is two-tiered, with 16 symbols representing basic concepts and then 7 symbols
representing what we might call meta-concepts. In AB, the alphabet of AD is
simplified to include only 9 symbols, and these symbols have different meanings
depending on their usage. Fig. 1 gives the interpretation of the alphabet of AB
in different contexts. The full combinatoric power of the Art comes to the fore
in AB, where it “became a method for ‘finding’ all the possible propositions and
syllogisms on any given subject and for verifying their truth or falsehood” [2,
p. 575]. The allowed combinations of the constant symbols in the alphabet are
2 This is a very compressed biography of Llull; for a more detailed history full of
exciting details, see [2, vol. 1, pp. 3–52], which includes extensive excerpts from
Llull’s autobiography Via coaetanea, and [3, ch. 1].
3 See [5] for further discussion of Llull’s status as a ‘computer scientist’.
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Fig. 2. The Fourth Figure
illustrated by various tables and diagrams4 of which the most interesting, from
the mechanist view of computation, is Figure 4 of the Ars brevis, which “has
three circles, the outermost of which is fixed and the two inside ones of which
are mobile” [2, p. 587]. Figure 4, redrawn from Plate XVIII, is given in Fig. 2.
By rotating the moving circles in various ways, one can extract valid syllogisms,
where the term on the middle circle is the middle term relating the two extremes,
which are located on the outer and inner circles.
The physical nature of the concentric, movable circles of the fourth figure al-
lows us to view this part of Llull’s combinatorial system as a crude mechanism for
computing new concepts (the output) on the basis of a given set of concepts (the
input). As Welch says, “The fourth figure was thus a primitive logical machine”
[6, p. 6], and Gardner calls it a “mechanical method” [3, p. 9]. Its primitiveness
comes from both the rude nature of its construction, and also the fact that it
essentially only handles intersection [7, p. 12]. But the primitiveness of it should
not detract from its novelty: It is, so far as is known, the first attempt to provide
a mechanistic and ‘mindless’ (in the sense of the word discussed above) physical
method of reasoning.5
Llull’s computational system is based purely on concepts; there is no arith-
metic involved.6 It is for this reason that we have selected Llull as an example
of the purely non-arithmetic conception of reasoning as computation. However,
4 The diagrams of the first, second, third, and fourth figures of the Ars brevis as found
in the Escorial MS are reproduced in [2] between pages 582 and 583; a selection of
figures from the Venice MS of AD, along with some interpretational tables by Bonner,
are given in the same source between pages 318 and 320.
5 We recognize that the introduction given here is nowhere near adequate. For further
discussion of Llull’s system, see [2] and [8].
6 One should not take this criticism unfairly: Without the notions of the ‘intension’
and ‘extension’ of a concept (ideas not developed until the 17th century), it is by no
means clear how one would associate numbers with concepts in any useful fashion
that would allow the numeric type of computation.
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this lack of mathematical foundation is often cited as one of the failures of his
system, which is cumbersome and not easily extended (even though, as Zweig
notes, “Llull believed his Art could be applied to all fields of knowledge and was
therefore a truly universalist system” [9, p. 22]). Llull’s mathematical näıvity was
one factor which motivated Leibniz’s search for a more rigorous and numerically-
based system of computation [6, p. 2]. We turn to discuss this in the next section.
Before concluding this section, we note in passing that if we understand “com-
putation” in the broad sense of “(algorithmic) process”, then Llull was by no
means the first to attempt a mechanistic view of reasoning. John of Salisbury,
writing in the middle of the 12th century, tells us that his student, William
of Soissons,
invented a device to revolutionize the old logic by constructing unac-
ceptable conclusions and demolishing the authoritative opinions of the
ancients [10, Bk. II, ch. 10, p. 98].7,8
According to Kneale and Kneale, some people have thought that William’s “ma-
chine” was a physical construction, akin to Jevon’s logical machine [13, p. 201],9
but both the Kneales and Martin have argued that “machine” should be under-
stood here in a metaphorical sense, and that it was likely that what William had
in mind was a method of argument-construction which, given a contradiction or
an impossible statement, would return any other statement [14, p. 565]. Whether
William’s machine was a concrete object, or merely a procedure for a reasoner
to follow, it is an interesting example of a computational method where the user
is no longer necessarily the reasoner; rather, it is the “machine” itself which is
doing the reasoning.10
3 Leibniz and the Computation of Numbers
Leibniz discovered Llull’s works at an early age; he discusses Llull in his Disser-
tatio de arte combinatoria (Dissertation on the combinatorial art, 1666), written
at the age of 19 [3, p. 3]. As Bonner notes, “the relational nature of Llull’s system
is fundamental to his idea of an Ars combinatoria” [5, p. 4]. Given Llull’s empha-
sis on binary and ternary relations and his combinatoric approach to reasoning,
7 Interim Willelmum Suessionensem, qui ad expugnandam, ut aiunt sui, logice uetus-
tatem et consequentias inopinabilies construendas et antiquorum sententias diruen-
das machinam postmodum fecit [11, Bk. II, ch. 10, p. 81].
8 Adamson [12, p. 27] translates John of Salisbury’s machinam as “method”, and the
Kneales translate it as “engine” [13, p. 201].
9 The Kneales do not say who these “some people” are, and I have been unable to
find this out myself.
10 All this talk of machines reasoning sounds anachronistic and, from the point of view
of the 12th century, futuristic. Interestingly, from the point of view of contemporary
artificial intelligence, while Leibniz believed that it was possible to mechanize (in
the physical sense of the word) these algorithmic processes, “he never thought that
we might invent a machine which could invent machines” [15, p. 110].
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it is no surprise that he was such a fascinating figure to a young Gottfried Wil-
helm Leibniz [5,6,16,17, p. 657]. Llull and Leibniz shared much in their guiding
philosophy and goals. They both shared the desire to provide a system within
which all theological controversies could be definitively solved. (Though they dif-
fered in the application of this system: Llull wanted to use it to show the Jew
and the Muslims their errors, and the truth of the Christian way, whereas Leib-
niz intended his to help resolve the splintering of the Catholic church that had
started in the previous century.) Both Llull and Leibniz also shared a belief in
what Welch calls “conceptual atomism, a belief that the majority of concepts are
compounds constructed from a relatively small number of primitives” [6, p. 2]
(cf. [4, p. 16] and [17, p. 20]). These primitives could be combined and related in
different ways which would allow the reasoner to generate complex information.
Llull and Leibniz also both developed combinatorial systems which exploited
physical systems of moving wheels [18, p. 274].11
However, Leibniz differed from Llull in two ways: As we noted in the previous
section, he criticized Llull’s mathematical näıvity and wished to ground his sys-
tems arithmetically, and he had access to the recently-developed notions of the
intension (or comprehension) and extension of a concept. If we wish to speak
anachronistically, we could say that, in so far as Llull’s concepts could be repre-
sented in a physical medium and manually manipulated, he identified concepts
with their extensions. Leibniz, on the other hand, discussed both intensional and
extensional interpretations of concepts in his arithmetization of language, in the
end preferring the intensional approach [20,21]. We offer Leibniz’s attempts to
arithmetize syllogistic as an illustration of the numeric interpretation of rea-
soning as computation. Leibniz made several different attempts to arithmetize
Aristotelian syllogistic in his pursuit of developing a universal language, of which
only the final attempt was successful. Given his belief in logical atomism, it was
a natural step for him to associate primitive concepts with their numeri charac-
teristici. If this is done properly, then more complex concepts could be reduced
to their constituent parts merely by knowing both the rules for the combination
of primitives and the mapping associating numbers with primitives, and further,
syllogistic statements, which assert relations between complex concepts, could
be represented by numeric relations between different numbers.
We consider two of the arithmetizations of syllogistic that Leibniz developed.
Recall that a syllogism is a set of three categorical proposition, where a categor-
ical proposition is one of the form “All S are P” or “Some S are P” (or their
negations, “Some S are not P” and “No S are P”, respectively, but since their
11 Hence it should be clear in the following that we are not trying to argue that Leibniz
did not have a mechanistic or purely concept-based view of reasoning; by no means is
that the case, as is amply illustrated by his combinatorial theory, e.g., as presented in
Dissertatio de Arte Combinatoria, which is much closer to the Llullian-style concep-
tual computation, relying less heavily on numeric support. This system is extensively
discussed in [18, ch. 5] and [19, ch. 3]. Since in this paper we are interested in his
developments which illustrate the approach of computing with numbers, we do not
discuss his developments which fall under the approach of computing with concepts
further here.
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truth conditions fall straightforwardly out of the truth conditions for the affirma-
tive claims, we will not consider them), where S and P are variables for terms
representing primitive or complex concepts. Leibniz focused on the syllogism
because he believed that all propositions could be reduced to subject-predicate
ones, meaning that all reasoning could be simulated with syllogistic reasoning
[19, p. 13]. In the first arithmetization attempt, each primitive concept is as-
sociated with a single positive integer; the characteristic number of a complex
concept is the multiplication of all the primitive concepts it contains (for ex-
ample, if 2 is ‘animal’ and 3 is ‘rational’, then 6 is ‘rational animal’=‘man’).12
Then, a universal affirmative proposition is true iff the characteristic number of
the subject term is divisible by the characteristic number of the predicate term
[22, p. 42]. These truth conditions are acceptable if one adopts the constraint
that no factor can appear in the characteristic number of a term more than once
(cf. [21, p. 3]); that is, he recognized the idempotence of properties. How to treat
particular affirmative propositions is less clear; Leibniz first offers the rule that
such a proposition is true iff the characteristic number of the predicate is divisi-
ble by the characteristic number of the subject, or vice versa [22, p. 43]. However,
this has the unfortunate consequence that a particular affirmative proposition
“Some S is P” implies either that every S is P or that every P is S, which is not
generally true. In a later manuscript, Leibniz revised the truth conditions for par-
ticular affirmative statements so that they are true whenever the characteristic
number of the subject term is multiplied by another integer, it is then divisi-
ble by the characteristic number of the predicate term [22, pp. 58,69]. However,
taken at face-value, this rule is also problematic; there is always some integer n
such that sn is divisible by p, namely p itself. Thus, this rule implies that “Some
S is P” is always true, which is unacceptable.
The second attempt at arithmetization [22, pp. 77–82] that we consider is
more sophisticated. We follow the presentation of Marshall:
Each term is assigned an ordered sequence of two relatively prime num-
bers, the first positive, the second negative. If each number assigned the
predicate term divides the corresponding number of the subject term, the
proposition is of the form ‘All a is b’. The negation of this form. . .will
be given if one of the two conditions is not met. . . If two of the non-
corresponding numbers (i.e., the positive assigned one term and the neg-
ative assigned the other) have a common divisor, the proposition is of
the type ‘No a is b. If this is not the case. . . , the proposition is of the
form ‘Some a is b’ [23, pp. 238–39].
This system has a number of points in its favor: It solves the problem of the triv-
iality of the affirmative particular sentences, and it validates all the Aristotelian
laws of conversion and valid syllogisms, and the square of opposition. But it
comes with its own problems. Consider the following assignment of character-
istic numbers to concepts: Let ‘pious man’ be assigned 〈2 × 5,−3〉; ‘fortunate
12 The association of primitives with numbers which can be uniquely factored out of
complex combinations of the primitives should strike the reader as reminiscent of
Gödel-numbering.
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man’ be assigned 〈23,−11〉, and ‘happy man’ be assigned 〈5,−1〉; and the fol-
lowing syllogism:
All pious men are happy.
Some pious man is not fortunate.
Some fortunate man is not happy.
On this assignment, the syllogism is verified (we leave the determination of this
to the reader: it is straightforward). However, it should be immediately clear that
this is not a valid argument; if we instead use the assignment of 〈24×7,−33×5〉,
〈22,−39〉, and 〈2,−33〉, for ‘pious’, ‘fortunate’, and ‘happy’ respectively, then
the syllogism is not validated. Leibniz concluded that there was an error in his
arithmetization, since, while it validates all of the valid syllogisms, it failed to
invalidate the invalid ones ([23, p. 240], [22, p. 334]). Note that if he had taken as
a rule that “If invalidating instantiations can be produced, the mood is invalid;
it is valid if they cannot” [23, p. 241], then Leibniz’s system would have been a
success (this is the argument of Marshall’s article). Not recognizing this, Leibniz
expressed dissatisfaction with the system presented above and ultimately gave
up his attempt at arithematizing language. Leibniz’s error, in his attempts, was
in trying to identify the atomistic primitive concepts too closely with numbers,
so that he could assign numeric properties to them. In the context of the present
paper, we can say that in this endeavor, he went too far on the computation as
(arithmetic) calculation interpretation.
4 Boole and the Synthesis
In Llull, we saw an example of a purely mechanistic, non-numeric system of
computation, based on concepts. With Leibniz’s attempts to arithmetize the syl-
logistic, we had an example of computation from the other end of the spectrum.
Both of these systems have their shortcomings, but both have points in their
favor. It was George Boole who took the best of both systems and created a
reasoning-system that combines both types of computation, a system which con-
tinues today to be widely used and extremely fruitful: Boole’s abstract algebras,
which lead to the development of Boolean algebras (cf. [29]).
Conceptually, Boole’s achievements rest heavily on Leibniz’s [22, ch. viii]. As
the Kneales note:
Leibniz realized already in the seventeenth century that there is some
resemblance between disjunction and conjunction of concepts on the one
hand and addition and multiplication of numbers on the other, but he
did not find it easy to formulate the resemblance precisely and then to
use it as the basis of a calculus of logic. It was this that George Boole
(1815–64) achieved in his Mathematical Analysis of Logic [13, p. 404].
Leibniz made “an attempt to improve the presentation of logic . . . by the use
of algebraic symbolism” [24, p. 158], though he was not as successful in doing
as he had hoped [23, p. 241]. However, Boole was not familiar with Leibniz’s
work until after both The Mathematical Analysis of Logic and Laws of Thought
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were published [25, § 5].13 (My thanks to one of the anonymous referees for this
reference.) Kneale argues that the immediately effective sources for Boole were
Gregory’s “On the Real Nature of Symbolical Algebra” and De Morgan’s four
papers on “The Foundation of Algebra” [24, p. 160] and that:
From these sources it was possible to collect two important discoveries:
(i) that there could be an algebra of entities which were not numbers in
any ordinary sense, and (ii) that the laws which hold for types of numbers
up to and including complex numbers need not all be retained together
in an algebraic system not applicable to such numbers [24, p. 160].
The importance of the calculus of operations in the development of English math-
ematics in the 19th century is discussed in great detail in [26]. Boole’s crucial
discovery was that “there could be an algebra of entities which were not numbers
in any ordinary sense” and that the ‘numeric’ laws governing these entities need
not be arithmetic [13, p. 405]. Boole’s elements of study were class-designating
concepts; that is, unlike Leibniz, he focused on the extension of concepts, rather
than their intensions [27, pp. 4–5], [28, p. 29]. In this way, Boole’s algebras
can be seen as synthesizing the insights of both Llull, who treated concepts in
an extensional fashion (speaking anachronistically) but without exploiting any
arithmetic tools, and Leibniz, who saw the utility of associating arithmetic prop-
erties with intensions, but went too far the other direction in trying to map
arithmetic properties directly onto the properties of intension.
The only question left for us to address in the remaining space is the extent
to which Boole’s algebras, viewed as a method of computation, have the ‘mind-
lessness’ property discussed in the opening section. It is certainly the case that
one can do these computations by rote, without having any idea of the meaning
(interpretation) of the symbols being manipulated.14 On the other hand, Boole
himself allowed the mindless application of symbolic manipulation only if this
was an intermediary step eventually followed by an active final step of reasoning
involving expanding the symbols to their meanings [29, pp. 173, 179]. He says:
It is of most material consequence, whether those symbols are used with
a full understanding of their meaning, with a perfect comprehension of
that which renders their use lawful, and an ability to expand the abbre-
viated forms of reasoning which they induce, into their full syllogistic
13 Even after Boole was introduced to Leibniz’s work, it is not clear what the extent of
his access was; during Boole’s lifetime many of Leibniz’s works languished unedited,
and it was not until Couturat’s edition in 1903 [22] that Leibniz’s important works
became generally available. In particular, it is not known whether Boole knew of
the Non Inelegans Specimen Demonstrandi in Abstractis (in the Erdmann edition
of 1840), which “was the only important piece of Leibniz on mathematical logic
then generally available. . . [Leibniz’s] most interesting papers lay still unread in the
library at Hanover” [24, p. 150].
14 This fact is recognized in the first sentence of the introduction to Boole’s Mathemat-
ical Analysis of Logic: “[T]he validity of the processes of analysis does not depend
upon the interpretation of the symbols which are employed, but solely upon the laws
of their combination” [27, p. 3].
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development; or whether they are mere unsuggestive characters, the use
of which is suffered to rest upon authority [27, p. 10].
Thus, we end with a two-faced observation: The first successful attempt at de-
veloping a system of computational reasoning was done by someone who would
only admit the mechanistic approach towards deduction as a preliminary step.
Even if we can have computers do our reasoning, it is still up to us to interpret
and apply the results.
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